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DIGTITAL WARS:





I. The Concepts of “Economic Value Added” and “Information 
Industry”
II. Property Wars




B. Digital Rights Management (“DRM”) technology
C. Spam and spyware
III. Monopoly Wars
A. Publishing mergers
B. Regional consolidation of telecom and cable networks
C. Cross-market monopoly leveraging 
1. Distribution plus publishing
2. The Windows wars
D. The end of the Last Mile Bottleneck?
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Introduction
“Information is born free but is everywhere in chains …”
Well, not quite. The streets are not festooned with guillotines, and there is more 
information at hand than anyone can hope to digest.
Still, the digital revolution has produced a startling anomaly. Though new information is 
now very cheap to create and near costless to share, the Information Industry seems set 
on condensing into mega-empires:
• Microsoft continues to own desktop computing, a nearly 20 year dominance, and 
continues to spread its monopoly power hither and yon – out to corporate servers 
and databases, web servers and browsers and media players, Internet application 
interoperability standards, cell phones, video games, etc.
• The old Ma Bell empire is reappearing around the duopoly of SBC and Verizon, 
and the US cell phone industry is similarly condensing to a few mega-players 
(tracking the experience of most other nations).
• Cable TV systems are consolidating into a national duopoly of Comcast and Time 
Warner, and satellite TV is now a Direct TV (Newscorp) v. Echostar duopoly.
• TV programming channels and content are increasingly dominated by huge 
corporate conglomerates, e.g. GE/NBC/Universal, Disney/ABC, Viacom, 
Newscorp, and Time Warner.
At the same time, the Industry appears locked into several near-perpetual legal battles, 
e.g.
• The Open Source Wars, pitting free software against proprietary programs.
• The Windows Wars, challenging Microsoft’s monopolies on antirust grounds.
• The Mogul Wars, where giant electronic publishers fight each other and the 
government to amass ever-larger swaths of digital content.
• The Last Mile Wars, arraying the telecomm and cable giants against each other to 
control broadband Internet access by households and businesses.
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• The Spam and Spyware Wars, raising basic questions about who owns 
information about the whereabouts and behavior of Internet users.
• The Napster Wars, pitting intellectual property owners against technologies and 
services that exploit the costless share-ability of digital information.
This paper explains all these things …
Well, not quite, not by a long shot. 
Instead the paper seeks only to survey in short compass this landscape of economic and 
legal turmoil by adopting a single point of focus. That point is a familiar proposition of 
neo-classical normative economics: industries should so function as to contribute the 
most value possible to the general economy, i.e. to the prosperity of everyone, and the 
framework of laws and public policy regarding an industry should be structured to enable 
that felicitous outcome.
By adopting a single norm, the paper sets aside the many other values that typically enter 
the fray, e.g. free speech, content diversity, democratic governance, privacy, the Dow 
Jones Average, America’s geo-political interests, the current account deficit, etc. But the 
general prosperity – the focus here – is not inevitably at odds with any one these. And, to 
the extent it is, that is worth knowing.
By focusing on economic value-added, the paper can only scoot far above the forest, 
ignoring lots of very consequential trees and bushes. The devils of the law always lurk in 
the details, and the paper must leave the fellows there, unattended. The aim here is 
merely to provide an introductory framework for understanding the Industry’s persistent 
economic bottlenecks and  major legal battles.
Part I summarizes the norm of economic value-added and offers a simple, rough 
economic taxonomy of the Information Industry.  The paper then moves on to examine 
the major legal battlefields, grouping these around the two broad issues of contention, i.e. 
property rights (Part II) and the dilemma of “natural” monopolies (Part III).
I. The Concepts of “Economic Value-Added”
and  “Information Industry”
Economists break an industry into its various markets, defined generally by the product 
or service offered (and, implicitly, by the geography effectively served). 
The standard model or graph of an industry market depicts the product’s price (vertical 
axis) against the number of units bought and sold over a defined period (horizontal axis). 
The “equilibrium” price/quantity point is where the industry’s upward sloping supply 
curve -- which reflects the marginal cost of providing the product – intersects the 
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industry’s downward sloping demand curve. The supply curve slopes up because 
suppliers maximize profits by pouring more resources into the market the higher the price 
they can fetch, while the demand curve slopes down because cheapness makes the 
product more affordable for consumers. 
 
The industry’s “value added” is the area between the supply and demand curves, to the 
left of the equilibrium point, and this area is in turn allocated between supplier profits 
(the area below the horizontal equilibrium price line) and consumer surplus (the area 
above that line). Value-added – the sum of profits and consumer surplus -- is the 
economic benefit bestowed on the wider economy by the industry’s existence and 
operation. 
The central theorem emerging from this standard model is that competing suppliers in a 
market will generate more value added than will a monopoly supplier. This is because 
competition forces each participating supplier to take the equilibrium price as a given,
while a monopolistic supplier can raise the market price (i.e. move upward to the left 
along the industry demand curve) by shrinking the quantity offered, creating a wedge 
area to the left of the competitive equilibrium point. This triangle represents the 
“deadweight loss” in value-added occasioned by monopoly.
The standard model’s policy recommendation is, therefore, to keep markets competitive, 
chiefly by preventing suppliers from colluding with respect to prices or supply quantities.
The model is of course a simplification. It assumes, for instance, that all suppliers 
products are identical (except for their marginal costs of supply), while in practice 
suppliers seek to “differentiate” their offerings via branding and distinctive functions and 
features. The result is “imperfect competition” and a range of supplier-distinctive 
equilibrium prices; in effect, each supplier has some “monopoly power” for its distinctive 
product. But if there is adequately high “substitutability” among the products, from the 
consumers’ perspective, the standard model still works, i.e. the market is still adequately 
definable as such. (In the case of information products, differentiation is invariably 
present; no two poems, paintings, or songs are identical.)
To apply this standard economic model to the Information Industry, we must first define 
that beast.
For purposes of this paper, an “information product” is any good or service designed to 
inform, entertain, communicate, or educate, and the Information Industry (“the Industry”) 
includes all the people, firms, and activities directly involved in creating, marketing, 
and/or distributing “information products.”  
This industry definition obviously sweeps in millions of distinguishable products and 
markets -- including most of what are commonly labeled the media, software, 
communications, and education industries. The Industry definition deliberately excludes, 
however, myriad “information rich” goods and services designed to serve purposes other 
than informing, entertaining, communicating, or educating, e.g. smart bombs, self-
Digital Wars: Introductory Overview 5
regulating thermostats, cars packed with transistors, avionics gear, toasters that sing 
before scorching your slice, etc. (Note that these definitions end up bifurcating the 
“software” industry: Software within “non-information products” is not an information 
product, but most standalone software programs are information products, as is software 
designed for use within devices -- including general purpose computers – designed to 
create, market, distribute, or use information products.)
The Industry can be segmented in a whole host of ways, depending on one’s purpose. For 
basic economic analysis, however, a simple tripartite segmentation works adequately:
Every person and firm on the “supplier” side of the Industry engages in one or more of 
these three activities – creating information products, marketing them (i.e. editing, 
packaging, branding, and promoting them), or distributing them from their creators or 
marketers to their  final customers.
Most Industry firms do two or more of these things, but each of these three activities has 
distinct economic attributes.
Creating: People create information products because we are an intellectually fecund 
species. Throughout history, zillions of stories, novels, gossip, poems, lectures, carvings, 
songs, plays – and, more recently, digital videos and software programs – have emerged 
without the slightest expectation of financial recompense. Patronage has regularly 
delivered great art, but so also have numberless drafty garrets, back-alleys, and hackers’ 
bedrooms. The digital age has now substantially shrunk the mechanical costs of 
intellectual creation and, in the process, greatly expanded the world-wide pool of 
creators. As a result, for any genre or type of information product, the “raw” supply curve 
– i.e. before the costs of marketing and distribution – is a horizontal line at zero or near-
zero price. Because some potential creators will pitch in only for financial reward, this 
supply curve eventually turns up – but way out to the right.
Marketing:  This is a more mundane and tedious set of activities – editing and packaging 
raw information products and branding and hawking them to potential consumers. These 
marketing activities could also be termed “publishing” (though absent the “physical” 
distribution function often included in that term). They servethe useful social purpose of 
reducing the search costs of potential customers and, in some circumstances, of creating a 
composite product more valuable to consumers than are its raw components. Few people 
will do “marketing” for nothing. The supply curve for these activities is therefore fairly 
conventional, sloping smoothly upward. That is, marketing is a classic “variable cost” 
endeavor.
Distributing:  This function used to require lugging things from place to place – books, 
stone tablets, newspapers, rolls of film, phonograph records, etc. Distribution now occurs 
digitally, via either electronic (occasionally photonic) networks or so-called “platform 
software” which can host and deliver applications software and other information 
products to users. Once the network or software platform exists, the distribution costs are 
trivial. But the upfront costs of building networks or software platforms, and the 
vulnerability of both to “network effects” results in very odd supply and demand curves 
Digital Wars: Introductory Overview 6
for digital distribution activities. Indeed, it is the distribution function of the Industry that 
is most prone to bizarre outbreaks, and spreading epidemics, of monopoly power.  
This brings us to the task of applying the standard economic model of “value added”  to 
the digital Information Industry.
The first problem that arises is that no two information products are identical: each poem 
(or song or story or painting) is distinct. But this problem is not unique to information 
products, and so does not itself prevent using the value-added model to analyze the 
Information Industry. The model, and its graphing of “a market”  is always a 
“generalization” from a messier reality. In almost every market, each supplier seeks to 
“differentiate” its offering by uniqueness of brand, quality, or features.  Each therefore 
enjoys a semi-unique demand curve, with the corollary limited ability to exercise a “mini-
monopoly”. Competition is “imperfect”, consisting of consumer substitution among the 
different products, taking into account all their differences, including price. 
There are, however, three genuinely serious obstacles to the simple application of the 
standard economic model and graph to markets for information products.
• The property dilemma: Unlike conventional products, digital information is 
costlessly sharable: if you and I synch our hard drives, I-Pods, or Ti-Vo’s, we can 
each fully enjoy the same digital information without detracting from each 
other’s enjoyment. With conventional products, by contrast, if you have it, I 
don’t, and vice versa, and so a price mediated transaction is necessary to move 
the product to the user who values it most. With a digital information product, 
once it exists, the best way to maximize its value added to the economy is to 
price all copies at zero. However, this eliminates any financial incentive for 
someone to create the information in the first place (or to market it to potential 
consumers).  Though lots of people will create information products without a 
financial incentive, some won’t. This simply means that there is an open question 
in the value added computation as to the “optimal” regime of property rights for 
information products: what regime will optimally balance the incentives required 
to produce information with the huge value added potential of free or cheap 
information? The standard economic model doesn’t help much in answering this 
question, because the standard model merely assumes that ownership and 
physical possession are more or less co-terminus.
• The natural monopoly dilemma: Collusion is not the only engine for achieving a 
lasting monopoly. In two situations, a “natural” monopoly can emerge – and both 
of these situations occur frequently and prominently in the Information Industry.  
In the first, the situation of “extreme scale economies”, a supplier faces very high 
upfront expenses – causing a very high marginal cost for the first unit of supply –
but the firm then enjoys very low and often decreasing marginal costs for the 
subsequent units it supplies. This gives the firm a downward sloping supply 
curve after the first unit. Enjoying a temporary monopoly from its initial entry 
into the market, the first-mover firm can price the subsequent units high enough 
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to recoup its upfront costs. Later entrants, however, will not have the monopoly 
power to recoup their entry costs – and may not enter at all. The result is a 
durable “natural” monopoly for the first entrant. An example is a fixed line 
telecommunications or cable TV service, where the first unit’s marginal cost 
includes massive investment in trenches, poles, wires, cables, transmitters, etc., 
but subsequent units of the service incur very low marginal costs. The second 
“natural monopoly” situation, so-called “network effects”, results in a demand 
curve that slopes bizarrely upward. This happens, for instance, with a proprietary
communications service, e.g. a proprietary telephone or instant messaging 
network: each user will value this proprietary service at a higher price the greater
is the number of other users. The initial service provider garners a natural 
monopoly because new users flock eagerly to where other users are 
accumulating. The same “network effects” phenomenon happens with platform 
software: the program that attracts the most third party “applications” will 
become more valuable per unit to its potential users, and more applications will 
inevitably get written for the most used platform. Natural monopolies – whether 
resulting from extreme scale economies or network effects --  are not curable by 
forced competition, e.g. by breaking up the monopoly firm into competing units: 
this merely destroys the value added generated by the extreme scale economies 
and/or network effects; and break-up would in any case prove only a temporary 
expedient, as the forces of natural monopoly would re-assert themselves all over 
again: one of the newly broken-up units would again take over the entire market.
• Cross-market leveraging of monopoly power:  The standard model’s graph deals 
with a single market over a defined time period. It therefore cannot capture the
phenomenon of “leveraging” monopoly power from one market into an adjacent 
market (e.g. a market that the monopolist buys from or sells to or that provides 
products complementing the monopolist’s product). Leveraging could occur by 
acquiring a firm in the adjacent market or simply by entering it aggressively. For 
many years, prevailing economic opinion held that cross-market monopoly 
leveraging was a rare and harmless phenomenon, because monopoly profit in the 
primary market is maximized by keeping adjacent markets conventionally 
competitive: such competition minimizes the monopolist’s input costs and/or 
maximizes end market demand for its product. So “leveraging” merely re-
allocates the monopoly profit from the primary markets into the adjacent markets 
and doesn’t add to total profits. This logic is generally sound -- but only if the 
adjacent markets can remain competitive.  If, on the other hand, they have strong 
natural monopoly characteristics, someone will monopolize these adjacent 
markets, and it is clearly in the primary monopolist’s profit-making interest to be 
that someone. This is doubly so if the adjacent market’s product is in fast-growing 
demand and/or has the potential to obsolete totally or in part the primary 
monopolist’s product. Leveraging then becomes a tactic of long term survival and 
also a way to control the dynamic pace of product innovation and new market 
emergence.  In that sense, cross-market leveraging allows the firm practicing it to 
retard or otherwise tame the forces of “creative destruction” in the industry.  All 
this is intensely relevant in the Information Industry, because this is an arena 
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where natural monopoly markets abound, and where the rapid invention of 
entirely new products and markets is itself a significant engine of competition and 
economic value creation.
These three “dilemmas” do not make the norm of “economic value added” any less 
persuasive, but they do mean that merely preventing collusion among suppliers is 
insufficient to optimize Industry value-added. Doing so instead requires special attention 
to property rules and to government policies regarding natural monopolies and the cross-
market leveraging of monopoly power.  And, not coincidentally, it is in precisely these 
areas that the Industry’s most persistent legal wars are being waged.
I. The Property Wars
To create a property right in a digital information product requires either a legislated 
regime of intellectual property protection, capable in its enforcement of foiling free 
copying, or a technology that makes possible the “physical possession” of information 
products. The chief forms of legislated intellectual property are copyright and patents, 
while the technology promising physical possession is called “digital rights management” 
(“DRM”).
A. Copyrights and patents
Any legally recognized property right, but particularly one created without physical 
possession, requires specifying three variables: the right’s trigger event, its duration, and 
its scope.  Copyright and patent law have spawned enormous controversies by their 
recent treatment of each of these variables.  The only point of wide-spread agreement is 
that economic value-added is indeed the correct criterion for testing various 
specifications. Though continental European law recognizes for creators an inalienable 
“natural right” to property in intellectual and artistic products,  the American Constitution
regards information as unowned by anyone absent positive law to the contrary; vests 
vests exclusively  in the federal Congress the power to create and recognize intellectual 
property rights; and limits this power to rights that ________.  But of course, the 
document does not detail how to craft the three variables of those property rights, and 
therein lies the rub.
1. Copyright
Before ____, the trigger event for copyright protection was the creator’s formal 
“registration” of his claim with the U.S. Copyright Office. This served to winnow out 
myriad information products whose creators didn’t care enough about financial reward to 
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bother with the registration formalities, and it also of course gave other creators a handy 
place to check on whether information they thought about using or re-working was 
legally protected. Today, however, copyright protection arises automatically upon the 
mere creation of an information product. No registration is required unless and until the 
claimant wishes to sue upon the claim.  This simple change in trigger has extended 
copyright all over the landscape; one must now prudently assume that every shred of 
information is legally protected, and there is in any case no way to find out one way or 
the other.
It is difficult to square this change in trigger with the norm of value-added. New 
information, of any type or genre, builds on old information. That’s the nature of 
intellectual innovation and cultural evolution.  To throw an automatic “don’t use or copy 
this” ban across all fragments of information in a society does not plausibly optimize the 
creation of new information. It retards it by generating needless uncertainty.
The duration of copyright has also greatly expanded since the Nation’s first copyright 
statute. The original protection lasted 14 years, with one 14 year renewal possible 
(through re-registration). Today, after several dramatic extensions, copyrights last 75 
years. {details}  Like the liberalization of the trigger event, this longer duration radically 
shrinks the scope of the public domain without adding plausibly to a new creator’s 
incentive to create. How many creators would really decide to down tools if their 
potential royalty period were 28 rather than 75 years; do you know any such peculiar 
people? I haven’t. Of course, those very few creators who hit upon a durable classic will 
always be happy to keep on reaping royalties for it  – but would they really have decided 
not to create the thing at the outset if limited to 28 years of royalties? {extensions 
included already active copyrights}
However, the weirdest deformities of modern copyright law – from a “value added” 
perspective -- concern the “scope” of protection, the third variable of the property right.
• The first copyright statute covered only words. Today the protection extends to all 
information products – songs, recordings, cartoons, pictures, plays, musical and 
stage performances, statues, movies and videos, and software programs – in a 
phrase, everything in the culture.  One can certainly argue that each of these 
things needs some sort of legal ownership right, but the statutes make little or no 
distinction concerning the  kind of legal protection these wildly diverse artifacts 
should enjoy.
• The application of copyright to software is particularly vexing. This is in part 
because software, even more than other information products, necessarily builds 
upon prior software: there are only so many “good” ways to program particular 
ideas and desired effects, and software programs must generally co-exist and co-
operate with software products already lodged on user computers. The coverage 
of  software is also problematic because software programs are created in five 
distinguishable stages, and no one can ever be sure what manifestations of which 
of these stages is in fact copyrightable. The first stage is the “functional 
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specification”, which typically is a general wish list of things some manager or 
entrepreneur would like to see the software accomplish for its customers. The 
second stage, the “technical specification”, is a programmer’s roadmap for 
building the software. The third stage, the “source code”, describes the program in 
detail in a “high level” language (e.g. Java, C++, Basic, Fortran) readable by other 
programmers. The forth stage, “object code”,  is merely thousands or millions of 
“1’s” and “0’s” that are readable only by a computer operating system, which then 
follows these digital instructions in telling the machine what to do. Object code is 
what the firm sells or licenses to users. (The firm generally keeps the source code 
a dark secret, files away the technical specification, and largely forgets the 
functional specification.) The firth stage is the “look and feel” of the program’s 
user interface on a computer monitor. Which of these five things is covered by a 
copyright on the “program”, and to what extent, is left by copyright law to case-
by-case adjudication and the gradual accumulation of inevitably inconsistent 
precedents grounded in facts and circumstances that are of course never exactly 
duplicated. The result is a legal regime that shrouds the entire software industry in 
uncertainty.
• Through a ___ quirk in legislative draftsmanship, copyright today protects against 
“copying” rather than, as originally intended, against “publishing”.  In the printing 
press age, the two were roughly identical. In the digital age, however, every 
viewing of a piece of information – every repeated “use” of it – generates a fresh 
computer copy of the thing. View a thing twice on the monitor and you are 
violating the copyright, unless specifically licensed for multiple copies. This 
infelicity in copyright’s formulation is, again, particularly anomalous as concerns 
software products. Most new programs are written to duplicate or improve upon 
what prior programs do, without however “copying” those other programs. This is 
how new programs compete against old ones in the market place. It is therefore 
standard practice in the industry to run an old programs’ object code multiple 
times in order to discern the logic of its source code, to learn how it does what it 
does, so that the new program can do these things better.  This “re-engineering” 
process, because it entails repeated “copying”, is technically a violation of the old 
program’s copyright. The courts have fortunately – so far – exempted re-
engineering from copyright liability, but this exemption is not embedded in statute 
and is accordingly subject to the shifting tides of judicial opinion.
• For conventional products, ownership of something is naturally delimited by the 
physical dimensions of the thing. Copyright protection, by contrast, extends to 
“derivatives” of the protected information. Since all new information builds 
necessarily builds upon prior information, the “derivative” concept is potentially –
and sadly also in practice – a dark cave in which many devils may lurk. Modern 
case law has dramatically extended the derivative notion, casting inevitable 
uncertainty around every work that in some way echoes or is inspired by or makes 
reference to an earlier work. 
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• There now exist – thanks to the meandering course of case law -- three varieties 
of “secondary” liability for copyright infringement -- contributory, vicarious, and 
induced infringement. Bluntly put, no one, not even the most expert intellectual 
property lawyer, can reliably tell you what each means or how they differ from 
each other. The cases are all over the lot. This is particularly troublesome in the 
digital age because of the possibility that supplying a use-neutral technology or 
technology-based service might give rise to a secondary liability finding under 
one or more of these theories. Until this year, it was reasonably clear that a use 
neutral technology or service would escape such liability, even if used after sale to 
infringe copyrights, as long as the it also had “substantial non-infringing uses”.  In 
MGM v. Grokster,  the Supreme Court reiterated this principle but held that 
copyright inducement could nonetheless attach to  a use-neutral file sharing 
service if its supplier actively sought out infringing customers and – perhaps most 
significantly -- that failure to take {easy steps] to block such infringements might 
be taken as confirmatory evidence of an intent to induce infringement. What this 
will mean over the long term to the legal risks facing technology innovators, no 
one is sure. The only certain thing is that there will now be lots more time 
consuming and expensive litigation brought against every technology and 
technology service that arguably is used in part by copyright infringers – which is, 
in fact, most digital technology.
• Finally, the two doctrines designed to limit the scope of copyright protection – the 
idea/expression distinction and the “fair use” defense – are both inherently vague 
and continuously mutable in their judicial interpretations, spawning endless 
litigation, which inevitably turns on tortured consideration of “multiple factors” 
that vary with the “facts and circumstances” of each case. This kind of judging 
may look “judicious” to lawyers, and it undeniably keeps them profitably 
engaged. But for litigants – for the people actually trying to function in the 
Industry – it is merely a long-winded way to say that there is, effectively, no law 
on which any advance reliance may be placed.  
In brief, it is difficult to believe that contemporary copyright law optimizes economic 
value-added from the Information Industry.  By excessively blocking new creators’ 
access to old information products—largely through the vagueness and over-reach of its 
component doctrines – copyright law has become a burden on, rather than an incentive 
for, Industry innovation. The  remedies are obvious, though politically very unrealistic at 
this point:  re-instate official registration as copyright’s trigger event, shorten the length 
of protection (particularly for software products), dramatically narrow the definition of 
“derivative” products, embed in statutory law the exemption for the software re-
engineering process, narrow the reach of secondary infringement liability as regards use-
neutral technologies and technology services, sharpen the vital idea v. expression 
distinction, and expand and clarify the standards for fair use of copyrighted material.
2. “Copyleft”
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The overreach of copyright law has in recent years spawned a very clever legal 
innovation that turns copyright upside down. Available in several variants, an “open 
source” copyright license essentially permits a creator to assure that his work – and all its 
future derivatives (by anyone) – will remain freely and permanently available in the 
public domain.  A so-called copyleft license is a conventional copyright document except 
for these revolutionary provisions. 
Open source licenses have spread rapidly throughout the software industry, giving birth –
through unpaid cooperative efforts -- to such products as the Linux operating system, the 
Apache web server, the Firefox web browser, and many important software components 
of the public Internet.  Linux now is challenging Microsoft Windows for market share in 
the corporate server market; Apache has long been the market leading web server; and 
Firefox is gaining market share (albeit from a small base level) from Microsoft’s Internet 
Explorer browser. Sun Microsystems has recently released its Solaris operating system 
and some of its Java technology under specialized open source licenses.  Linux is now 
championed by large technology vendors, such as IBM and Hewlett Packard, who have 
committed large sums to its marketing and technical support.
The open source model is also now being tried in non-software markets, e.g. for music, 
videos, and books. Particularly in underdeveloped economies, there is clearly widespread 
enthusiasm for the vision of “free culture”.
The aim of the open source movement is to create a large storehouse of information 
products that everyone can freely use, adapt, customize, and improve (with such changes 
also entering the copyleft public domain). Doubts certainly remain whether this model of 
collaborative, financially uncompensated creative effort can produce products of the 
highest quality and sophistication. But it is difficult to disparage such early successes as 
Linux, Apache, and Firefox on those grounds. The real promise of the movement – other 
than the “anti-commerce” ideology and enthusiasm of its advocates – is the simple fact 
that creation in the open source universe does not face the financial barriers to the use and 
reworking of old information that burdens de novo innovation in today’s conventional 
copyright universe.
3. Software Patents
Most information products (e.g. stories, poems, songs, videos, etc.) cannot be patented. 
Patent law was designed to protect (with a 20 year monopoly) inventions that are novel, 
useful, and non-obvious to people reasonably experienced in the particular trade or 
profession. 
But software can be patented. This was not so until 15 years ago, because software 
programs were regarded as merely a collection of “if/then” algorithms – in effect as 
“mathematics” – and mathematical formulas and equations cannot be patented.  The legal 
logic of the courts’ self-reversal  need not detain us. Some sort of reversal was no doubt 
inevitable, and economically justified, because machines today have progressively used 
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software to replace internal components that were once levers, cogs, and wheels.  So 
inventing a new, useful, non-obvious “machine” for nearly any purpose is today in part a 
software programming exercise. However, the courts did not stop there; they deemed all
software programs eligible for patent applications, i.e. including those stand-alone 
programs which this paper includes within the Information Industry, i.e. programs 
designed to inform, entertain, communicate, or educate or that host products that do these 
things.  At the same time, the courts declared that even “business processes” and 
“business methods” are patentable (e.g. Amazon’s “one click ordering” idea for online 
commerce).
This makes no economic sense.
• Software already enjoys copyright protection. Adding another layer of 
intellectual property is at best redundant, but is in fact usually much worse 
than that. Copyright and patent doctrines are confusingly inconsistent. (i) If 
it’s uncertain in many cases which of the five stages of software production 
are covered by a copyright, patent protection imperially reaches out to cover
all the stages. Software firms routinely claim patents on their “source code”, 
even though – under standard patent doctrine – anything patented must be 
disclosed to the public, and source code is rarely disclosed. (ii) The 
idea/expression distinction that is supposed to limit copyright’s scope has no 
place in patent law: ideas are patentable. That’s why business methods and 
processes are now patentable, and so also (presumably) are the “functional 
specifications” and “technical specifications” which are drafted merely to 
guide a programming exercise. (iii.) Patent law recognizes no “fair use” 
defense to infringement. (iv.) Both copyright and patent law cover 
“derivatives” of the protected product, but the derivative doctrines are 
different under the two bodies of law. In consequence, the double intellectual 
property protection of software adds many layers of uncertainty for any 
innovator sitting down to write a new program that may echo in some way 
the logic or purposes, or even the conceptual ideas, of existing programs.
• Patent litigation is phenomenally expensive, lengthy, and uncertain in its 
results, even compared to copyright litigation (which is itself no slouch on 
these fronts).  Big established firms can afford this burden, and can 
additionally afford to amass a sufficient portfolio of patents to counterattack 
any small or start-up firm that may choose to bring a patent infringement 
suit. Though ostensibly designed to protect the maverick entrepreneur and 
innovator, patent law in its litigation economics and dynamics tilts the odds
heavily in favor of large, entrenched firms.  Since many of the really 
important innovations in the Information Industry have historically emerged 
out of small, start-up companies, this is no trivial problem.
• The Patent Office is notoriously understaffed and ill-equipped to understand 
or vet the myriad, exotic software and business process/method patent 
applications streaming regularly from the Information Industry. Therefore, 
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thousands of such patents have been issued which no doubt would prove 
invalid in litigation (because of lack of novelty, utility, or  non-obviousness). 
But the costs of litigation are so high that these roguish patents nonetheless 
often cow innovators into settling court challenges for large sums or, more 
often, into simply giving up on innovating in a field that shows lots of issued 
patents.
• Nearly all commercial software and business process/method innovation 
takes place under the spur of intense marketplace competition. The firm 
innovates because its survival and prosperity require it; absent the 
innovation, innovate competitors would surge ahead. In most cases, this 
sheer race for commercial survival and temporary competitive advantage 
provides more than enough “incentive” to innovate: slapping on a 20 year 
legal monopoly is not needed for these innovations to emerge. With software 
and business processes and methods, we are not dealing with the lone 
visionary who must spend years in his garage or basement to come up with a 
totally revolutionary new technology. We are instead dealing with a near 
continuous process of innovative improvements upon prior programs and 
business models. Patent law is simply not needed in this environment. And 
indeed the software industry, and business models throughout the 
Information Industry, witnessed extremely rapid change and invention for 
many years before the courts decided to recognize the patentability of such 
innovations.
• The patentability of software throws into question the viability of the entire 
“copyleft” movement mentioned above. Open source programs, which 
combine and mix the work of many programmers, can easily end 
incorporating some code against which some company could no doubt claim 
patent infringement and demand royalties. But the copyleft license will 
generally preclude payment of royalties, putting the user of the open source 
software into a legal Catch 22. Observers have noted, for instance, that 
Microsoft’s vast patent portfolio likely contains some claims that could be 
lodged against the Linux open source operating system. Though I am not 
aware Microsoft has used patent infringement threats in its market share 
struggle against Linux, the possibility has already caused considerable 
consternation in the large community of companies now deploying Linux.
The obvious remedy for all this silliness is legislation to exclude stand-alone (or, if you 
prefer, “Information Industry”) software from patentability, and throwing into the 
excluded category – for good measure – all business processes and methods. This would
still leave patentable the “software innards” of conventional, machine-like inventions. 
Though such a solution would obviously require some tedious line drawing, the notion is 
hardly novel or impractical: the European Union is currently debating a similar scheme.
Its major detractors are even more radical: they would leave all software outside the 
scope of patent protection.
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B. Digital Rights Management (“DRM”)
Just as digital technology makes feasible the costless and unlimited share-ability of 
information products, it now makes it possible the “physical” eradication of that peculiar 
attribute. Technology – called digital rights management (“DRM”) technology -- is now 
coming to market that permits the creator or marketeer of a digital information product to 
dictate precisely who may use or otherwise experience, copy, and/or further distribute the 
product and on precisely what terms and conditions.
DRM re-unites ownership and possession in a far more detailed and exact manner than is 
true even for conventional tangible products. With a conventional product, you typically 
sell it or lease it on reasonably simple terms, and that’s that. The buyer of a sold good can 
then do anything he wants with it. A lessee is bound by the lease terms. In effect, 
however, DRM enables the creator to break  a product  into many other products, each 
distinguished by its permissible use and the stipulated terms and conditions of that use.  
Products become “proprietary” in detail, a regime that makes copyright and patent 
protection look like a 98 pound weakling. DRM recognizes none of the “duration” or 
“scope” limitations of copyright (however excessive or vague these might be), and 
permits, for instance, the “ownership” of ideas, not just expressions, and need not allow 
for any “fair use”. But DRM does require the non-trivial “trigger event” of setting up and 
technologically protecting the terms and conditions of use and distribution: the creator or 
marketer must decide upfront on how widely used and distributed he will make his 
product, and how expensively he will price it, and DRM does not cover “derivatives” of 
the product (so long as these have not been confected by someone via breaching the 
terms and conditions of the DRM). These are all economically value-adding features of 
DRM as compared with copyright protection. Using DRM alone, a creator cannot – as 
copyright law allows -- simply sit back and wait to see if, at some later point, someone 
has arguably intruded on his unregistered legal rights and therefore might be forced to 
pay damages for so doing. With DRM the fact and terms of protection are clear to all 
from the outset.
Needless to say, most opponents of copyright overreach are even more heated in their 
opposition to DRM technology, fearing it could in effect “enclose” the entire culture 
behind digital walls. Few if any of these opponents would outlaw the use of DRM. Rather 
the battles to come will no doubt center on laws that criminalize technological 
“circumvention” of DRM systems. 
On grounds of value-added, it’s difficult to fault DRM technology itself, as all it does is 
turn information into a precisely measurable and priceable product, and creators remain 
free to use it to recreate exactly the terms and conditions of a “copyleft” license. The real 
problem is, I believe, the combination of DRM and copyright law (not to speak of patent 
law). If government is to use anti-circumvention law to protect DRM, a provocative 
trade-off is worth considering: bar circumvention only where the creator using DRM has 
explicitly waived the protections of copyright. 
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C. Spam and Spyware:
Users of online services – email, websites, online commerce services, etc. – automatically 
generate lots of information about themselves: email addresses, the sites and subjects 
they consult on the Web, the stuff they buy or consider online, the things they talk about 
in their emailing or instant messaging, etc.  Digital technology permits those on the other
end of the line, and often  third parties who scan and crawl about the Internet, to learn and 
amass this information. This information is then used by both “legitimate” commercial 
firms and assorted rogues and hackers to access the users who generated it, usually to 
advertise or offer products to them, and of course sometimes just to annoy or damage 
them. The result is email “spam” and various sorts of spyware and adware that gets 
stealthily implanted on the user’s computer.
In sorting out the rights and wrongs of all this, judges and legislators have typically 
resorted to rough analogies with “off-line” commerce or to tangentially relevant legal 
doctrines that range from free speech, through copyright law and trespass on choses, to 
various privacy doctrines. But, to analyze the economics of alternative solutions, and also 
to achieve some kind of coherence to the emerging law across this whole area, the basic 
question is “who should be deemed to ‘own’ this user information?” 
There are two conceivable answers: the users themselves or those who amass and 
compile the information (which is, at least initially, the provider of the online service or 
of sub-services riding atop the primary service). 
The information is obviously very valuable: that’s why it gets commercially used, rented, 
and abused so lavishly The value accrues in two stages, first at its generation by each 
user, and then by the compilation and cross-indexing of the raw information across a 
number of users. Though one can tarry here to consider whether one of the two
assignments of property rights – to users or to the information-gathering online service --
would minimize “transaction costs”, but this isn’t necessary: transactions in cyberspace 
are very cheap. 
The value maximizing solution would appear to be to vest ownership in the initial user –
the modest fellow about whom the raw information pertains. This is the only solution that 
nicely and precisely slices the two stages of value and therefore accurately captures both 
in a pricing schema. The online service would, in such a regime, be required to secure the 
user’s OK to include his information in a compilation of such information and, for this 
OK to be informed, the online service would have to disclose how the information may 
be used. One can imagine that for some users and some downstream uses, an OK will be 
forthcoming only for pay, in cash or kind. But so what? If the raw information will add 
value to the compilation, the compiler will pay accordingly, as in all commercial 
exchanges.
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And indeed most legislation regarding spam and spyware does now give a central role to 
user permission, though none simply state that users “own” information about 
themselves. The differences among the various statutes and legislative proposals center 
on the exact type of user permission that is required (there being in practice an enormous 
behavioral difference between explicitly saying OK and simply neglecting to “opt out” of 
an otherwise automatic transfer of ownership.)  Needless to say, companies in the 
business of compiling multi-user data prefer the weakest conceivable permission 
requirement, as this artificially reduces their cost of goods sold – not a compelling 
argument from the point of view of total economic value-added.
The really hard public policy work still to be done concerns practical issues regarding 
enforcement of the user ownership right. The difficulties are of several types, most 
prominently the technical problem of finding the violators (because the underlying 
protocols of the Internet permit great anonymity) and, secondarily, the legal problem of 
fashioning workable civil and/or criminal remedies that will optimally deter violations.
II. The Monopoly Wars
The distribution function in the Industry is rarely “competitive” in the normal sense. 
That’s because digital information distribution is vulnerable to the two forces of “natural 
monopoly”, i.e. extreme scale economies and network effects.  These forces have created 
major economic bottlenecks in two large sectors of distribution, platform software and 
electronic networks. 
A. Platform Software
The term “platform software” refers simply to any program whose purpose, in whole or 
part, is to host other software programs, i.e. “deliver” them to users.  Microsoft’s 
Windows operating system is the classic case: while its chief purported purpose is to 
control the internal functioning of a computer’s various components, its users (and 
Microsoft itself) focus instead on Window’s capacity to host software applications.  And 
of course Windows has for several years been the target of mammoth antitrust battles in 
the United States and the European Union.
Everyone knows – and the courts have now found – that Windows enjoys a monopoly in 
the desktop/laptop operating system market. Whether Microsoft obtained this monopoly 
by superior technology and skill or by improper competitive tactics is of historic interest, 
but is economically uninteresting. (The issue is also not the focus of the antitrust 
litigation.) The economically salient reality is that this market constitutes a natural 
monopoly; someone was going to monopolize it, and Microsoft got the brass ring.  The 
source of natural monopoly here was not extreme scale economies caused by high R&D 
launch cost.  Operating systems do not require fortunes of money or time to invent, and in 
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any case Microsoft bought its initial operating system product for a song from its 
inventor.  Rather, “network effects” were the source of natural monopoly: once Microsoft 
got a lead market share (through a skillful partnership with IBM), the company’s 
operating system naturally attracted most of the industry’s third party applications, which 
fact further expanded the operating system’s user community, and so on and on in a 
virtuous cycle of market domination.
If monopoly was inevitable for someone, why care about it, especially because networks 
effects themselves generate lots of economic value? 
There are two answers, and both center on the same phenomenon, the “proprietary” 
technical standard by which Windows interfaces with applications (i.e. the operating 
system’s application program interface or “API”).  
It is in theory possible to conceive of non-proprietary, i.e. “open”, API’s. If such an open 
standard prevailed throughout the operating systems market, massive network effects 
would still occur, but these would not create monopoly. Since all suppliers’ products
would be “open” to the same applications, these suppliers would have to compete, in the 
“normal” way, solely on the technical merits and marketing appeal of their respective 
operating systems. In short, an open standard, by wedding network effects to the virtues 
of competition, would enhance the value-added by the operating system industry to the 
general economy. Needless, competition between open standards operating systems 
would result in lower prices and profits for all of them, but the corollary expansion in 
consumer surplus would more than make up the difference in terms of total value-added.
So the first reason to care about the Windows monopoly is that, in an ideal world of open 
API’s, it was not inevitable.
The second reason is that Microsoft has sought to leverage its PC monopoly into all 
manner of adjacent markets, and its chief vehicle for this tactic has been that same 
proprietary API.  When it targets an adjacent market for future dominance, the company 
uses its control of the Windows API to disadvantage all other adjacent market 
competitors, i.e. to keep them from interfacing easily with the Windows operating 
system. This can be accomplished by keeping API changes secret from those competitors 
or, more directly, by simply “incorporating” the Microsoft product into Windows as a 
new feature of the operating system, shielded by the proprietary API.  These are tactics 
which no competing company in the adjacent market can mimic or effectively offset.
These tactics have been much on display in Microsoft’s assaults on the office 
applications, web browser, corporate server, and web media player markets. 
As theory would predict, such leveraging makes eminent profit sense for Microsoft 
because each of these adjacent markets has natural monopoly effects of its own and a 
significant potential for displacing over time Windows’ role as a platform for host for 
application programs.  One can ask here, as earlier, whether it makes any difference 
whether Microsoft or someone else monopolizes these adjacent markets. As before, one 
answer points to the theoretical possibility of rendering these adjacent markets 
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competitive via open API standards. There is, however, yet another answer. When a 
single company can leverage its monopoly status across multiple markets, that company 
gains the power to control the very pace and contours of creative destruction in the 
market. It becomes able to dictate, often just by signaling its intentions, to retard the 
invention and marketing of new products and the emergence of new markets. The 
company achieves control over the dynamic development of a entire sector of the 
Industry.
The US and EU antitrust prosecutions both aimed squarely at this cross-market 
leveraging of monopoly power.  The EU case drags on, but the European Commission 
does appear to have wrestled directly with the economic realities of monopoly 
leveraging. The US case is largely over (though with continued federal court monitoring 
of the consent decree agreed between Microsoft and the Justice Department and with 
follow-on private antitrust cases now moving toward final settlement).  But the 
controlling appellate decision betrayed considerable hesitation in facing the leveraging 
phenomenon full on. (In essence, the Court affirmed that leveraging can constitute an 
illegal “defense” of an existing monopoly but refused, on the evidence developed at trial, 
to hold that this same leveraging constitutes an illegal attempt to monopolize the target 
market.)  One suspects the Court felt restrained by the doctrinal muddle that has 
surrounded the leveraging phenomenon in American scholarly and judicial writings for a 
number of years.
There remains, on both sides of the Atlantic, considerable doubt that antitrust courts have 
the tools necessary to thwart or rectify monopoly leveraging in the software industry.  
The US consent decree and the EU tentative judgment both seek to insulate Windows’ 
adjacent markets from leveraging by forcing the company to make its API standards 
more “open”, in hopes that Microsoft’s adjacent market products won’t then enjoy an 
unfair advantage over competitors.  But this approach to remedies is replete with 
problems. First, Microsoft never tires of characterizing this forced “openness” as a theft 
of its intellectual property. This is a spurious argument, because adverse judgments 
typically require property forfeiture in all areas of law, and because there is at any rate no 
public policy rational for affording intellectual property rights to the API’s of monopoly 
software platforms. These are little strings of mundane code, requiring no great inventive 
genius. Second, the judiciary is plainly unsuited to the unending and very detailed 
technical monitoring necessary to assure that an API remains adequately open. Finally, of 
course, the sheer duration of antitrust litigation means that none of the markets initially at 
stake in the US and EU cases remains fully competitive; Microsoft has seized its critical 
competitive edge in each one already.
The US trial court did impose a remedy that would largely overcome this objection: 
forced divestiture of Microsoft into two independent companies, one owning Windows, 
the other Microsoft’s various adjacent market products. This would have created a 
dynamically competitive industry structure in a single stroke. But the appellate court 
reversed this remedy, deeming it too “drastic”. This is a common misunderstanding of 
US antitrust courts. Corporate America undertakes such wholesale divestitures on its own 
hook all the time, generally to the benefit of all constituencies involved. But such a 
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solution is unlikely to reappear in US or EU antitrust litigation regarding the monopoly 
leveraging of platform software programs.
The best solution for the monopoly leveraging problem is more aggressive US and 
foreign government assistance to and endorsement of industry-wide standard setting 
bodies, particularly those seeking to create and enforce technical “interconnection” 
standards across the Industry.  These bodies face big obstacles. Interested parties have 
many reasons and opportunities to force delays and introduce complications, and it is no 
easy matter for a “neutral” body to keep up with the numerous technical issues and 
changes necessary to maintain a competent standard in a dynamic industry.  But the 
relative success of the major Internet standards bodies suggest the task is doable, and it is 
almost always better to get a standard than to waste months and years chasing some 
technically ideal standard. Put simply, the economic value-creating potential of 
successful standard-setting efforts is enormous and deserves vigorous government 
support.
B. Electronic Networks
Since their advent with 19th century telegraphy, electronic networks have typically 
displayed strong natural monopoly characteristics because of both extreme scale 
economies (i.e. the high upfront cost of erecting the networks) and pervasive network 
effects (operating among both network consumers and at the interface with content or 
programming services that can reach consumers only via the networks). This has been 
true of radio and TV broadcast networks, cable TV systems, satellite TV, and fixed line 
and cell system telecommunications networks. The Internet has uniquely avoided the 
natural monopoly fate because its launch costs were borne by the federal government and 
its network effects have remained uncapturable by proprietary interconnection standards.
Unlike the case of platform software, “open” interconnection standards for electronic 
networks pose the potentially value-eroding “free rider” problem: if competing networks 
can openly attach to the market’s “leading” network – either freely or for a mere 
“marginal cost” fee – the resulting collapse of monopoly pricing may well dissuade 
investors from the investment necessary to launch and upgrade networks. (This “free 
rider” problem doesn’t arise for platform software, because software platforms can 
usually be created at fairly low upfront costs.)
As a result, natural monopoly has remained a major dilemma for public policy regarding 
all electronic networks. Masses of confusing, overlapping, and no doubt highly inefficient 
laws and regulations consequently emesh the electronic network universe at all levels of 
government, municipal, state, and federal.
Currently, the most important and heated debates in this area concern broadband (i.e. 
“fast”) user access to the public Internet. Each type of existing electronic network  is 
capable of providing such access (e.g. via DSL for fixed line telecommunications 
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networks, technical modifications for cable networks, and various technical supplements 
or upgrades  for broadcast, satellite, and cellular phone networks). However, in each case, 
the particular network enjoys a monopoly or nearly so at the local level, facing serious 
competition only from networks based on other technologies (e.g. the phone company 
versus the cable TV company as one’s broadband access provider).  This local monopoly 
power constitutes the so-called “last mile problem”, and it lies at the center of most of the 
current legal wars concerning electronic networks.
These legal battles have raised four broad issues:
• Should public policy seek to retard the national consolidation of local monopoly 
networks?
• Should each network be required, somehow, to “open” itself to competing 
networks?
• Should public policy seek to restrain the backward integration of electronic 
networks with content services?
• Can new technology itself solve the “last mile” dilemma?
1. National consolidation of local monopoly networks
Recent years have witnessed the rapid national consolidation of local players in each 
network type, via multiple acquisitions and mergers. The 1984 break-up of ATT 
produced eight regional phone companies and a long distance company, the latter facing 
competition from MCI. There are now only two giants in this vast space – SBC and 
Verizon – along with several smaller players. Similarly, the cable industry has morphed 
from a highly fragmented  landscape to a near duopoly of Comcast and Time Warner at 
the national level, and similar trends of consolidation are evident in cellular telephony 
and satellite TV. Broadcast radio networks have condensed around Clear Channel, and 
TV broadcast networks seem stuck at five major players (NBC, CBS, ABC, Fox, and 
Univision).
Does this really matter in terms of Industry value-creation?  The national consolidations 
have plausibly brought significant scale economy cost reductions in network 
infrastructure and operating routines, and arguably have done nothing to increase the 
local or “last mile” monopoly power of the companies vis a vis network consumers.
Accordingly, federal antitrust authorities have generally hesitated to restrain the 
consolidating mergers, and the few exceptional cases of government objection (e.g. 
disapproval of the proposed merger of Sprint and Worldcom) appear in retrospect to have 
been ill advised.
However, the national consolidations have arguably led to serious value erosion by 
creating very considerable monopsony power over providers of network content (e.g. 
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television programs and cable TV channels). The competitive norm for value creation 
applies to supplier markets as well as to user markets. Indeed, reduction in programming 
costs has been a very major motive for the national network consolidations. 
But the issue is now mute. The national network giants now exist, and no one is seriously 
urging their break-up.
2. Forcing electronic networks to “open up” to competing networks
During the Clinton Administration, the FCC actively sought to force telecommunications
networks to lease access to other providers of Internet access (so-called ISP’s) and to 
competing local phone companies (so-called CLEC’s and ALEC’s).  Extremely elaborate 
pricing regulations emerged, strive to keep these lease prices low while avoiding the “free 
rider” problem. 
The regulations remained controversial on every side and spawned massive litigation and 
political lobbying at all levels of government. The policy of forced openness did trigger 
the entry of many new ISP and CLEC/ALEC companies into the telecommunications 
space, but nearly all of them went bankrupt when the FCC changed course during the 
Bush Administration, pruned or eliminated the pricing regulations,  and instead began to 
lean toward encouraging competition for phone and Internet access services between the 
cable and telecommunications industries.
Meanwhile, various industry and political partisans sought, through extensive legislative 
and regulatory lobbying and litigation, to force the cable systems companies to open their 
networks to ISP’s. This issue was, for instance, a major factor in FTC deliberations on the 
merger of Time Warner and AOL, the concern being that AOL would become a sole or 
preferred provider of ISP services over Time Warner’s cable networks.
The current trend at the FCC and in the courts is against forced openness, for either 
telecommunications or cable companies.  Whether Congress will re-enter the fray on this 
issue, and seek a redrafting of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, no one knows. For 
right now, however, competition in the market for broadband Internet access is pretty 
clearly a contest between the national giants of the cable and telecommunications sectors, 
with each player enjoying a “last mile” monopoly in its own technology space.  In short, 
each household and business desiring broadband access will face a duopoly. Whether the 
result will be quasi-competitive or quasi-monopoly pricing options is not something 
predictable through economic theory. Duopolies pose an indeterminate situation as 
regards pricing behavior, with “game theory” capable of indicating a variety of outcomes.
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3. Backward integration of electronic networks into 
information/programming content
Should monopoly networks be legally permitted to own content providers, e.g. cable 
channels and TV program producers?  
Many already do. The big cable systems companies have major ownership stakes in many 
of the leading cable channels, and Comcast even contemplated buying Disney; broadcast 
TV networks have for a number of years sought to produce their own programs; the big 
telecommunications network companies regularly make plans to develop or buy content 
providers.
This practice can have obvious anti-competitive tendencies. Network ownership can 
result in a balkanization of the content industry and raise significantly the cost and 
difficulty of entering that industry.  That said, there are several reasons to doubt that 
backward integration should be legally banned:
• The content industry has very few “natural monopoly” characteristics. That means 
it is almost impossible to monopolize. The phenomenon of cross-market 
leveraging of monopoly power is unlikely to work through backward integration 
into the content business. The more likely long-term result is a dilution of the 
network’s primary monopoly. And indeed it is questionable whether any of the 
networks engaging in backward integration hope to gain durable monopoly power 
over content. The more likely motives are to fashion some temporary way to 
differentiate the primary network product or to hedge against the rainy day when 
network monopoly power itself wanes through the forces of technological 
advance.
• With broadband access, virtually all content can be served directly to users via the 
Internet. Soon, for instance, cable channels and TV programs will likely be 
available on any computerized viewing device. Providing broadband access is the 
prime competitive arena between cable, telecommunications, and cellular 
networks. So none of these will in fact be able to provide “exclusive” access to 
content.
• Cable networks and broadcast networks that have attempted backward integration 
have swiftly found that, to maximize total profits, they have to buy and sell 
content to and from their backward-integrating competitors.  This of course does 
away with any monopolizing potential for backward integration. (Indeed Viacom 
has recently decided to split into two companies, one owning the CBS broadcast 
network, the other holding most of the cable channel and movie and TV program 
production assets.)
4. New technology to dissolve the Last Mile Bottleneck
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The last mile bottleneck derives ultimately from the high upfront costs of erecting 
electronic networks that bridge from a major Internet node out to households  or 
businesses. These high costs characterize every “fixed line” network (e.g. copper wire, 
cable, or fiber optic networks) and also cellular wireless networks that requiring many re-
transmitting cellular antennas and accelerators.  The high costs create extreme scale 
economies, which in turn create natural monopoly power, and this, finally, is often 
fortified with government grants of monopoly franchises.
Current “Wi-Fi” technology radically reduces the upfront costs of Internet connections, 
but its range is only 100 yards or so, not a “mile”. However, next generation Wi-Fi 
technology – which goes under the WiMax label -- promises to extend that range to 20-
50 miles. The system would be based on powerful transceiver towers (each directly 
accessing a major Internet node) that communicate at high speeds, back and forth, with 
specialized chips embedded in the users’ desktop, laptop,  or other computerized device 
(e.g. a next generation television). Because of the vast range of each tower, the launch 
costs per potential user for such next generation networks would be very low.
Led by Intel, which is developing WiMax chips which it hopes to embed in all PC 
devices, a group of big technology and networking companies is very rapidly progressing 
on all elements of this new technology, aiming for mass market roll-out within the next 
18-36 months.
WiMax would indeed appear to hold the promise of substantially banishing the last mile 
bottleneck and thereby greatly reducing the user costs of broadband access to the Internet 
(beyond which point digital information distribution becomes virtually free for users). 
The technology would of course simultaneously and drastically reduce the monopoly 
power and profits (and stock market capitalization) of all existing fixed line networks. 
Whether this promise is fulfilled, however, will depend on the course of public policy at 
all governmental levels over the next several years.
• The industry-wide protocols and standards for WiMax are now nearing 
completion, but would be helped by firm federal government endorsement and 
encouragement of the effort, signaling for instance disapproval of any company 
interested lobbying to delay or sabotage the effort.
• The FCC will have to free enough  radio spectrum to WiMax.  Various species of 
that technology could – via “frequency hopping” that taps underutilized radio 
wave capacity -- largely avoid the spectrum interference problem that has for 
decades served to justify exclusive FCC spectrum allocations to particularly 
companies and uses.  But the simplest near-term solution is for the FCC to clear a 
comfortably broad frequency range for WiMax. One expect that certain status quo 
spectrum owners, and certain large fixed-line network companies, may try to 
discourage or impede the FCC in this effort. 
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• Perhaps most important, the federal government, states, and/or local governments 
will need to sort out the basic question of “ownership” for the WiMax towers. If a 
single company in a locality is afforded an exclusive franchise to build and 
operate these towers,  that company could of course charge users a monopoly 
price for its use, in effect re-introducing a last mile monopoly bottleneck. More 
ominously (and predictably), tower ownership by an existing fixed-line 
networking company would lead to WiMax service pricing designed to preserve 
the monopoly pricing advantages of the owner’s other network(s).  There are two 
alternate solutions. The first would simply permit all comers to build and own 
WiMax towers in a locality. Because of the relatively low upfront investment 
needed, one could expect several tower systems to develop in each locality, and 
competition between them would keep prices low to the user community. There 
would not likely emerge an unsightly “forest” of towers, in part because the 
returns from building a system would not justify such proliferation, and in part 
because the wide transception range of the technology requires so few towers per 
system. The second solution is for a locality to grant an exclusive franchise to one 
tower system owner but require that owner to lease use of the system to all ISP’s 
on an even playing field basis. The lease costs would get baked into the fee each 
ISP charges to its users, but inter-ISP competition would keep these fees low and 
therefore set a ceiling on the tower system owner’s lease charges. This solution 
has the obvious downside, however, of turning the tower system owner into a 
public utility or regulated “carrier”, requiring some agency for policing of the 
whole system. History does not reflect kindly on the efficiency of such 
arrangements.
One can expect, at any rate, that all these public policy issues surrounding WiMax will 
become of the tomorrow’s great battlegrounds for the digital Information Industry.
Conclusion
Two broad problems restrict the value which the Information Industry could contribute to 
the general economy: a confused and overreaching system of property rights, and the 
natural monopoly forces that extreme scale economies and network effects inflict across 
the Industry’s distribution functions.
The property rights problem derives from major imperfections in intellectual property 
law. The goal of this law is to balance incentives to create new information against the 
inevitably value-eroding effect of limiting the costless use and sharing of digital 
information. Copyright and patent law have erected such broad and vague definitions of 
intellectual property that both sides of the balance are damaged.  The definitions sharply 
erode the value of free use but, in the process, so restrict access to past information as to 
hamper the creation of new information. 
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There are two solutions. 
One is to reform intellectual property law, e.g. providing a clear trigger event for 
copyright and sharply limiting the duration and scope of copyright coverage, and doing 
away with the patentability of Information Industry software. 
The second solution is to junk intellectual property law for digitized information and 
replace it with governmental protection of DRM technologies, which would in effect turn 
intellectual property into a more or less normal form of “physical possession” property.
DRM would likely create a more hermetically sealed “private domain” than today’s, but 
it would likely be smaller, and its contours, and the terms and conditions for entering and 
using it, would be far clearer than is provided by contemporary intellectual property law.
The value-added equation would obviously differ substantially between these two 
solutions, but this author at least remains agnostic as to which would best serve general 
economic prosperity, convinced only that either would be better than the confused regime 
we have now and, certainly, than a regime that merely adds DRM protection to the 
current imperfect system of intellectual property law.
The natural monopoly problem in the Industry’s distribution segment centers on platform 
software and on fixed-line electronic networks. 
The platform software problem is difficult to remedy via antitrust litigation. The most 
efficient public policy regarding the problem is aggressive government support for the 
rapid adoption of industry-wide “open” standards for the interoperability of software 
products. This solution preserves, indeed enhances, the value-creating potential of 
network effects but prevents the monopolistic “enclosure” of those effects behind 
proprietary API’s and similar interoperability standards.
The electronic network problem traces ultimately to the high cost of building fixed-line 
networks out to the “last mile” to individual households and businesses. Only new 
technology can reduce that cost, and WiMax technology seems poised to do just that over 
the next few years. But, for WiMax to bear fruit for the general economy, government 
policy will need to help the technology overcome predictable legal and political barriers.  
It is particularly important that state and local governments prevent existing fixed-line 
network companies from securing exclusive, monopoly franchises to build and run 
tomorrow’s WiMax systems.
Few of the proposals suggested in this paper would find favor with companies that have 
profited handsomely from the imperfections in intellectual property law or the natural 
monopoly forces surrounding platform software and contemporary electronic networks.  
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